T|SOR|22|7|23

contents

5 **Cyprus**

6 **The Historical Background**
Christopher Lake

13 **Cyprus, Greece and Turkey**
Eric Baker

17 **A Turkish View**
Mehmed Salih

20 **A Greek View**
A. G. Gavrielides

22 **An Appeal**

23 **Cyprus : National Crisis or International Conflict**
John Dragoumis

29 **Conciliation**
Richard Hauser

32 **Emergency Meeting on Cyprus**
Devi Prasad

34 **Letters**

38 **Stuart Morris Retires**
Harold F. Bing

41 **A View of Sarvodaya**
Max Maxwell

44 **In Orbit**

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Christopher Lake visited Greece and Turkey many times between 1932 and 1939. He was a conscientious objector during the war and after three months' imprisonment was discharged. In 1946 he first visited Cyprus, teaching at the Turkish secondary school in Nicosia. In 1947 he spent 5 months in Greece studying Byzantine and Modern Greek history. From 1951 he taught in a Greek secondary school in Famagusta for 4 years and from 1953 also taught in a Greek secondary school. In 1959 he paid a short visit to Cyprus to study the situation as Joint Hon. Secretary of the National Cypriot Committee. He is on the British CND National Council, a member of the PPU and vice-chairman of the League for Democracy in Greece.

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5 CYPRUS

Special Report



6 The Historical Background

Christopher Lake

Cyprus is an island in the Eastern Mediterranean which is at present chiefly inhabited by Greeks (81 per cent.) and Turks (18 per cent.). The Island is about half the size of Wales with a population of 550,000.

Greeks first settled in Cyprus well over three thousand years ago, and, although the Island has at different periods been dominated by Assyrians, Persians, Egyptians, Romans, Crusaders, Venetians, Turks and British, the bulk of the population has remained Greek. For eight hundred years (395-1191) Cyprus was part of the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire which was in reality a Greek Christian Empire, and throughout the subsequent long years of foreign rule the Greek Orthodox Church kept alive the national consciousness of the people. In Greece, in 1821, it was the Bishop of Patras who raised the standard of revolt at the beginning of the Greek War of Independence, so it is not surprising that Archbishop Makarios should be regarded by most Greek Cypriots as their natural leader in their struggle for independence.

The British occupation of Cyprus began in 1878 when Britain leased the Island from Turkey on the understanding that she would come to the assistance of Turkey in the event of an attack by Russia. The tribute which Britain paid to the Sultan was extracted from the Cypriots and was a cause of much dissatisfaction, though the arrival of the British was generally welcomed by most Greek Cypriots. The help given by Lord Byron (who died at Missolonghi in 1824) and many other British philhellenes to the cause of Greek independence has never been forgotten and the Greek Cypriots felt confident that British rule in Cyprus would be but a prelude to Union with Greece in the same way that it had been in the Ionian Islands which Britain gave to Greece in 1864. They believed that their complete liberation from foreign rule could not be far off and their desire for Union was mentioned by the then Archbishop of Cyprus in his address of welcome to the first British High Commissioner. In 1881 the British Government received a memorial which stated that "the Cypriots, mindful of their history, have never forgotten their Hellenic origin. Relying on the magnanimity of the British nation they hope that in due

time favourable consideration will be given to their aspirations. Their only aspiration is the Union with their mother-country Greece, in accordance with the precedent of the Ionian Islands". Similar declarations were made at frequent intervals during the whole period of British rule.

In 1914 when Turkey sided with Germany against Britain, Britain annexed Cyprus. She offered it to Greece in 1915 on condition that Greece went to the immediate assistance of Serbia. Greece did not join the Western Allies until 1917 and Britain allowed her previous offer to be forgotten. At the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 Turkey renounced all claim to Cyprus, and the Island became a crown colony in 1925.

As long as Britain held a secure military base in Egypt little interest was taken in the welfare of Cyprus, and those years of neglect have not been forgotten. From 1882 to 1931 there was an elected legislative council, but, as the Greek members were equalled in number by the Official and the Turkish members (who nearly always voted together) and the Governor had a casting vote, it was not really representative and contributed to a general feeling of frustration among the Greeks. This came to a head in 1931 when there were riots in the Island and Government House was burnt down, but no British people were hurt. The Government abolished the Constitution and from then until 1960 the people had no elected representatives. The then Archbishop together with the Bishops of Kyrenia and Kition (Larnaca) were sent into exile and severe measures were adopted to suppress the desire for Union. It should be noted here that the Archbishop and the Bishops are elected by the people.

The Enosis (Union) movement was forced underground, but it inevitably became stronger. During the second World War when Britain and Greece were fighting together and alone against Germany and Italy in 1940-41 some of the repressive measures were relaxed and the Cypriots were encouraged to fight for 'freedom'. Many of them lost their lives, and when the war was over and the Cypriots reiterated their demand for Union they found that freedom was not for them. They became more and more disillusioned and lost their faith in Britain. They gradually came to realise that, in spite of Britain's professions of friendship for Greece, she had no intention of allowing the Cypriots to decide their own future. Speeches were made, peaceful demonstrations took place and delegations were sent to England, but Britain refused even to discuss the question of Union.

A new Constitution was offered in 1947, but, as it gave very little real power to the Cypriots, it received a cold reception. The left-wing leaders of that period, who had for a short time advocated self-government rather than union with a Greece divided by civil war, did agree to consider the British proposals, but when they found they were losing much popular support as a result of

abandoning the "Union and only Union" line, their co-operation was short-lived.

Since the Island became of more strategic importance Britain has done much good work in Cyprus, stamping out malaria, improving water supplies, creating new forests and roads and preserving ancient monuments, but the faithful and disinterested work of many government officials has been obliterated in the minds of the people by the British refusal to grant them the right of self-determination. Until about ten years ago most Greek Cypriots seemed confident that as soon as the British people really understood the justice of their desire for Union with Greece, everything could be peacefully arranged. Matters were brought to a head by Britain's blank refusal to discuss any change in the status of Cyprus and by the decision to make the Island an important military base. The Cypriots noticed that violence in Egypt and Palestine did assist in the departure of the British, and it was natural that some of them drew the regrettable conclusion that Britain will be persuaded by the use of force while she only turns a deaf ear to delegations and peaceful demonstrations. It is a sad fact that the polite requests of the Cypriots over a long period of years were known to very few people, while the throwing of a few bombs in April 1955 gave immediate and world-wide publicity to the Cyprus question. It was a great pity that the Greek Cypriots resorted to violence in their struggle for freedom, instead of adopting the more powerful instrument of non-violent resistance, but it was Britain that taught them to put their trust in force.

The use of violence in the national struggle was, in fact, immediately condemned by the leaders of the Communist-line AKEL party. Many members of AKEL were supporters of the Cyprus Peace Committee (though this committee was not entirely left-wing and enjoyed the support of a few Turks, Armenians and English), and in the summer of 1955 well over 100,000 signatures were collected for a petition against the building of military bases in Cyprus. It was the strong and increasingly popular line taken by AKEL in demanding self-determination without bases that caused the Governor in December 1955 to ban the party and all left-wing newspapers, and to imprison 135 communists without any charges being made against them. This may also have been done with the hope of creating the false impression abroad that communists in Cyprus were responsible for the violence.

The "terrorist" organisation EOKA was a right-wing group, and although at the outset many Cypriots condemned its use of violence it came to be regarded by most people as a liberation movement. The various repressive measures taken by the British authorities against it did in fact increase its popularity and strengthen anti-British feeling. When collective fines were imposed on villages more antagonism was aroused against Britain than against EOKA and when schoolboy demonstrators were shot they

9 became heroes and martyrs. British efforts at maintaining "law and order" by force were regarded as acts of terrorism by the local population, and they became more and more determined to see an end of British rule.

The most tragic result of the armed struggle was the creation of hatred and bitterness between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish minority (18 per cent.) is descended from those Turks who settled in the Island during the period of Turkish occupation (1570-1878). Turks are to be found in most parts of the Island and, although some villages are completely Turkish, there are many places inhabited by both Greeks and Turks. Owing to the differences in religion there is practically no intermarriage between the two communities. For hundreds of years they have lived peacefully together even when Greece and Turkey were at war (as in 1897, 1912-13, 1917-23). On the whole the Turkish Cypriots were content with British rule and adopted a passive attitude to the struggle of the Greek Cypriots for self-determination. It was not until 1954 that the "Cyprus is Turkish" movement became active in Turkey and then in Cyprus, and the nationalistic feelings of the Turks were actively encouraged from Ankara. The idea of partition was first put forward in 1957, and to strengthen their claim they took advantage of the disturbed situation in Cyprus in 1958 to drive the Greek inhabitants out of three predominantly Turkish areas (the northern part of Nicosia, the walled town of Famagusta, and Lefka). The enmity between the Greeks and Turks was indirectly encouraged by the British who wished to try and justify their remaining in Cyprus. By saying that they must stay in Cyprus to protect the rights of the Turkish minority, Britain caused the Greeks to feel resentment against the Turks (because they were used as an excuse for depriving the Greeks of what they wanted), and she encouraged the Turks in their belief that they were in need of protection. It should be noted that the Turkish minority in Greece (in Western Thrace and Rhodes) is well treated by the Greeks, and no separatist movement exists in this community.

In an attempt to solve the Cyprus problem in 1959 the Governments of Britain, Greece and Turkey signed the Zurich and London Agreements which formed the basis for the 1960 Constitution of Cyprus. These Agreements were drafted without consulting the Cypriots who have never had an opportunity of voting on the terms of the Constitution. The Greek Cypriot leaders, having failed in their attempt to get some of the provisions of the Agreements changed, decided (under considerable pressure) to accept the Agreements as they stood rather than risk further bloodshed in Cyprus.

According to the Zurich and London Agreements the Greek Cypriots were to give up their demand for Union with Greece, the Turkish Cypriots were to give up their demand for Partition, and Cyprus was to become an independent state. It has been stated

that the Constitution could be made to work if there were goodwill and understanding between the two communities, but the Constitution itself is designed in such a way that it inevitably accentuates differences, causes friction and tends to perpetuate division. The three Powers instead of aiming at a return to a unified country, introduced various separatist elements which widened the differences between the two communities. Instead of encouraging all the inhabitants to regard themselves as Cypriots, the fact that they are Greeks or Turks is given emphasis. On the pretext of protecting the minority, the Turkish community has been given privileges out of all proportion to its numerical strength.

As will be seen from the following details, the Turkish minority has been given privileges far in excess of any other minority outside racialist states and it is in a position to overrule the wishes of the great majority. The Turkish minority has the right:

1) To elect the Vice-President of the Republic by a separate poll and not as part of the general electorate of the whole country.

2) To appoint three Ministers in the Cabinet of ten members whether or not they are approved by the President and House of Representatives.

3) To elect by a separate poll 15 (out of 50) members of the House of Representatives.

4) To have a Communal Chamber of Representatives with the exclusive right to govern all matters of religion, education, agricultural co-operation and economic development of the Turkish minority.

5) To participate in government departments in the following ratios: 30% in the Civil Service, 30% in the Police Force, 40% in the Army.

6) The Turkish Vice-President has a *final Veto* on Cabinet decisions and on any law or decision of the House of Representatives concerning foreign affairs, defence and security.

7) All taxation legislation must have the approval of the separate majority of the 15 Turkish members of the House of Representatives. It is thus possible for 8 Turks to stop legislation approved by 42.

8) Members of the Turkish minority can only be tried by Courts composed of Turkish judges. This creates duplication in the legal services, helps to perpetuate the separation of the citizens of the Republic into two self-centred nationalities, and creates a danger of discrimination in the application of justice.

9) The Constitution provides for the setting up of separate Greek and Turkish municipalities in the five main towns. As the towns are small and the population very mixed this would lead to increased friction.

During the past three years it has become increasingly obvious that effective democratic government is impossible under the present Constitution and the Treaty of Guarantee.

The Treaty of Guarantee of 1959 deprives the people of Cyprus of full independence since it gives to Britain, Greece and Turkey the right to intervene in the internal affairs of the Republic and prevents the Cypriots from regulating their own affairs which is the right of all free peoples.

The privileges given to the Turkish minority make it possible for it perpetually to frustrate the wishes of the majority. For example the Turkish members of the House of Representatives have refused to pass by their separate majority various necessary taxation laws and to approve fiscal agreements with foreign countries and companies for the construction of a number of development works in Cyprus with foreign investment. Thus the country has been without income tax collecting laws since 1961, the collection of customs duties is chaotic and the loss inflicted on the development of the economy is very great.

Most of the Greek Cypriots have accepted the fact that Union with Greece is not possible, and they are now anxious to make Cyprus a unified and independent state with a democratic constitution that will really work. For this reason Archbishop Makarios submitted in November 1963 some proposed constitutional amendments for the consideration of the Turkish community. He received a reply, not from the Turkish Cypriots, but from the Turkish Government in Ankara which stated that there must be no alteration to the Constitution. Unfortunately the leaders of the Turkish Cypriots have not given up their demand for Partition and they have been using the Constitution towards furthering this aim.

To judge from Turkish statements their idea of partition is not that they should have one-fifth of the Island in accordance with their proportion of the population, but that they should have at least half of it. There appears to be plenty of evidence to support the idea that extremists in the Turkish community set out to provoke the Greek community in December 1963 so that when the Greeks retaliated they could shout that they were being massacred, and then with the assistance of armed intervention from Turkey impose partition on Cyprus by force. It was fortunate that British forces were able to come at once and help to keep the peace in response to a request from Archbishop Makarios, but it was most unfortunate that Britain dissuaded the Cyprus Government from taking the matter to the United Nations immediately. Her desire

not to upset her NATO ally Turkey, and to safeguard her bases on the Island may have influenced this attitude.

During the wasted two months more lives were lost, and the situation facing the United Nations is more difficult now than it would have been two months ago. Many of the Turks who have left mixed villages have been forced by armed members of their own community to do so as part of the Turkish policy of trying to separate the two communities and to give the impression abroad that all Turks are afraid of living with the Greeks. There is evidence that Turks have been beaten up by Turks for continuing to be friendly with the Greeks.

It is not surprising that in this tense situation the Greek Cypriots should retaliate when attacked, especially when they feel that the Turkish minority is being used by the Turkish Government to deprive them of their independence, but most of the Greeks realise that the continuation of violence does no good to their cause and they are anxious to live in peace with the Turks and work with them for the general good of the Island. The longer this disturbed situation continues the more the economy suffers, and the more difficult it will be to heal divisions and forget the recent past.

If the United Nations force in Cyprus is able to maintain peace and create an atmosphere in which the Greeks and Turks no longer live in fear of attack, it should be possible for Greek and Turkish Cypriots to get down to the job of making a new Constitution that will help towards bringing them together as Cypriots. Adequate safeguards must be provided, as in all democratic countries, to protect the minority, but this does not mean that the minority should be in a position as at present perpetually to thwart the wishes of the majority because this makes nonsense of democratic government. The independence of Cyprus should be guaranteed by the United Nations in order to remove the danger of invasion from Turkey and thus encourage the extremist leaders of the Turkish Cypriots to be more co-operative. The aim must be the creation of a united, independent and democratic republic in which everyone, whether they are Greeks, Turks, Armenians or Maronites, can really work together for the happiness and prosperity of Cyprus.

Copies of War Resistance, 4th Quarter, 1963, Vol. 2, No. 7, required by the Editor.

13 Cyprus, Greece and Turkey

Eric Baker

It is not possible to confine this paper to Cyprus alone. To understand the remarkable potentiality which this small island possesses for arousing international anxieties, it is essential to recognise that its population of 400,000 Greek and 100,000 Turkish Cypriots is in fact the focus of Greek-Turkish relations on the mainland. Put briefly, if there are in both Greece and Turkey strong governments determined that nothing shall imperil the building up of good relations between them, then in the Island itself hostilities between the two communities are likely to be at least muted. The recent withdrawal of Karamanlis from Greek politics, however, and the strains inherent in what is virtually a military government in Turkey has created a condition of instability which has presented both Greek and Turkish nationalists on the Island with an opportunity which they have used to what they believe is their own advantage. First, a few brief comments on the situation in Cyprus itself:

1) There is no such thing as Cypriot nationality. There are Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, but they are Greeks or Turks first and Cypriots only as an afterthought.

2) The Turks feel themselves at a disadvantage partly because the Greeks are better educated (and therefore have less difficulty in finding their quota for civil service posts) and partly because they believe the Greeks will always be able to outwit them in propaganda.

3) The Greek demand for re-union with Greece has, as a natural reaction, provoked a Turkish determination to take steps to avoid finding themselves ruled by Greeks — hence the demand for Partition.

4) Partition would from any but the political point of view be the worst solution and I doubt whether the ordinary Turk would demand it; but he is loyal to his leaders, among whom Raouf Denktash, who is the more effective, seems determined on this solution.

5) Memories are long in this part of the world and Greeks and Turks on the Island share the historic enmities of Greeks and Turks on the mainland.

6) Britain is sensitive to instability in the Island not only because of her military bases there, but because of its possible disruptive effect on NATO of which Greece and Turkey are both members.

Turkey

When the Army seized power in May, 1960, it sincerely believed the Revolution would be followed by a rapid modernisation of the country and the re-establishment of democratic government. But it underestimated the opposition of the masses, large numbers of whom remained loyal to the memory of Menderes, the Prime Minister whose death by hanging (at the hands of the Army junta) had made him a legendary hero. Consequently, even under Inonu, the shadow of the Army hangs heavy over Turkey; but more potent still is the apparent inability of a forward-looking professionally trained minority (civilian and military) to explain their purposes to the majority.

What seemed to me the most serious aspect of the scene in Turkey was the gulf which separates the city intellectual from the 80% of the population which lives in the 40,000 villages of the countryside. The "intellectuals", the journalists, university economists (often the same), the students and the younger men in the Army are feeling their way towards the political theories which would guide their country out of its present poverty. Despite the ban on "leftist" thinking in Turkey and the country's innate revulsion against anything Russian, I found some who were prepared for the redistribution of incomes through state machinery. It is notable, however, that these same intellectuals who speak so feelingly of the poverty of their country appear to recognise no obligation to work with the poor themselves — they are, rather, repelled by them.

The gap between those who understand the needs of the country and the ordinary people without whose co-operation they cannot be met, faces Turkey wih a dangerous dilemma. On the one hand, if the demands of the poor peasant for immediate improvements were to prevail, Turkey would be back on the Menderes road to inflation and economic disaster. On the other hand, if economic discretion can be maintained only against the wishes of the majority, the day of reckoning may be postponed—but only at a cost which may be nonetheless disastrous.

Greece

In contrast to the difficult situation in Turkey, Greece presents superficially at least an air of bright hopefulness.

Whereas Turkey, neutral during the war, started the post-war period with an economy relatively undisturbed, Greece had scarcely emerged from the rigours of the Italian-German occupation when she was plunged into a civil war which lasted until 1948. But to-day, while Turkey's economy is at best in a state of precarious convalescence, its statistics of doubtful reliability, its plan scarcely off the drawing board and foreign capital (apart from inter-governmental loans) extremelv cautious, Greece has not only recovered from the economic disaster of the 1940's but has drawn up plans, enlisted the co-operation of foreign firms in establishing new industries and is setting about the modernisation of her administration and education.

While, however, Greece differs so radically from Turkey on the surface, at deeper levels, there is a remarkable similarity.

Government economists acknowledge that Greece has a million unemployed or under-employed and in discussion with economists I was very interested to note how keenly aware they were of the political implications of the situation. In view of the banning of the Communist Party and the discredit which the government (under Karamanlis) tried to throw on any "leftist" thinking, I tried to find out whether there were any non-Marxist but "left" thinking around on which the discontent of "the labouring poor" could be focussed. They not only admitted that there was not, but added "We have got to show results — and have only a limited time in which to do it". I put the same question to the Greek trade unions. They too agreed about the lack and regretted that they had not yet been able to form a Labour Party (in fact they all seem to have been too busy quarrelling among themselves, mainly over the Communist issue).

The purpose of the foregoing has been to emphasise that the significance of Cyprus is far greater than the occasional dramatic crisis which it manages to precipitate every three or four years. The Island is, in fact, a classic 'case study' for those who are interested in seeking the causes of hostility in order to work out ways of avoiding or resolving conflicts without resort to violence. With this in mind, I offer the following questions as being worthy of study:

1) Why was there little conflict between Turks and Greeks in the Island before 1878 when it was handed over to Britain? Was the control of the Turks so firm that the Greeks realised a rebellion had no chance of succeeding?

2) Why was there such worthwhile co-operation between Greeks and Turks in Cyprus under British rule? Was it again because a strong third party 'held the ring' so that neither Greeks nor Turks felt it necessary to assert their rights?

3) What finally decided Makarios that he would not oppose the use of guerilla warfare as a method of achieving Enosis?

4) At what point in 1958 did the Turkish community decide that they had to act for themselves?

5) Again, what finally decided Greece and Turkey to come to terms in 1959? What part did the temporary collapse of the Baghdad Pact play in convincing Turkey of the need to bring about a détente over Cyprus?

6) What decided Britain that she could not, after all, have 'Cyprus as a base' and would instead have to choose 'a base in Cyprus'?

7) Which leaders among the Turks in Cyprus have decided that the Island must be partitioned and what are their real reasons for so deciding?

8) How much, in fact, do the Turks and Greeks in the villages really share the hostilities of Greeks and Turks in the towns and how far are village hostilities the result of the activities of agitators from the towns?

9) At what point did British troops cease to be able to act impartially between Greeks and Turks?

10) What are the political conditions in Greece and Turkey which seem to be most favourable to (a) peace (b) hostilities in the Island.

This list is concerned principally with the analysis of the causes of peace and of unrest in the past. Equally important, of course, will be the prescription for re-establishing stability. The first job of the United Nations is, no doubt, to prevent further bloodshed and terrorism, but if co-operation between the races is to be established, the UN, like Britain before it, may in addition, have to set on foot purposeful attempts at developing joint action — not for the sake of being 'joint' but because the jobs need to be done.
How this is to be done when one side has adopted the deliberate policy of destroying what co-operation existed and the other has given them considerable provocation, is not easy to foresee, but a careful study of what Eugene Black called 'Development Diplomacy' as it has grown within the work of the World Bank might offer a clue to the solution.

17 A Turkish View

Mehmed Salih

In assessing the present crisis in Cyprus, its causes and remedial actions to be taken, we dare not lose sight of the realities which led to the ceration of the Cyprus Republic as an independent state.
Each country, each state has its own peculiar and individual characteristics. That is why it is dangerous to apply general principles in complete disregard of such peculiarities. The facts about Cyprus are as follows:—

Although there is an island 40 miles south of Turkey called Cyprus, there is not such a thing in the world as a "Cypriot Nation" neither is there a Cypriot language. Briefly, in Cyprus there are two communities — Turks and Greeks — with different languages, different religions, different beliefs, different cultures and different backgrounds. With nothing in common between the Turks and Greeks, for Cyprus, in becoming an independent republic in 1960, the main problem was how to reconcile the various conflicting views to the satisfaction of the two communities. From the start the Greeks were for ENOSIS (Union with Greece) which to the Turks meant nothing but a change in colonial rule. In June 1958 the Greek terrorist organisation EOKA started a campaign of killing anyone who stood in the way of ENOSIS. This led to an inter-communal strife which for two months cost 200 lives on both sides.

The Turkish policy on the other hand was for a solution which did not leave the Turks under the rule of Greece or under a form of government by the Greeks under which the Turks would be treated as second-class citizens. We had good examples of what life would be under them. Accordingly Turks claimed the partition of the Island (Union with Turkey at first) into Turkish and Greek parts in accordance with Article 73(B) of the United Nations Charter, which was the practical application of the principle of self-determination both for Greeks and Turks. With Turks and Greeks fighting for the realisation of different aspirations it was obvious that more bloodshed was to follow. These considerations made each side move from its stand and agree on a form of Constitution which both sides endorsed as being the only means by which all the conflicting interests could be reconciled to the satis-

faction of the two communities. In the drafting of this Constitution both sides made the maximum sacrifices they could and a balanced relationship of their respective rights was established. The Turkish community is not a privileged minority as it is so often mistakenly represented. It is instead a partner in the Republic's administration. Indeed in the Government service there are such services that necessitate almost equal numbers of each community: since there is not a Cypriot language all Government transactions are communicated in the two languages. The aim of the drafters of the Constitution was to secure adequate facilities for all members of both communities irrespective of their numbers.

Four years have passed since Cyprus became a republic but Makarios refused to implement most of the provisions of the Constitution, in fact all those relating to Turkish rights. This was the Constitution about which he said on signing the Agreements (London and Zurich Agreements) on the 19th February 1959 "It is my firm belief that with sincere understanding and mutual confidence we can work together in a way that will leave no room for dissension about any written provisions and guarantees". This is what Makarios said, yet it is Makarios himself who, as soon as Cyprus became a republic, chose to defy the Constitution — the very document which gave birth to the Republic. It is the same man who from the very beginning declared that he would use the Constitution as a springboard to achieve Union with Greece. It is this same man who, to achieve his selfish ambitions at any cost, created a pretext and unleashed his forces and thousands of terrorists who showed no mercy in attacking and killing Turkish women, children and old people in accordance with their preconceived plan to annihilate the Turkish population of Cyprus. It is the forces of the same man who looted, burnt down hundreds of houses and other property, took hundreds of hostages, tortured and imprisoned them for no offence other than their simply being Turks.

His excuse for all these genocidal acts is the impracticability of the Constitution. This sorry excuse may satisfy uninformed opinion and render the outsider a victim of Greek propaganda, but it does not fit the facts. The facts are that Makarios has not implemented the Constitution (other than its provisions for the election of Ministers and the President himself). How could he then argue about the unworkability of the Constitution without sincerely trying to implement it and giving a sufficient number of years to see its application in practice? In the light of what experience is he to amend the Constitution? If, however, Makarios was of the view that the Constitution was unworkable at the time of signing he is guilty of deceit. It would have been more statesmanlike and indeed more honest not to participate in the drafting of such a Constitution and not to become its first President.

The truth is that it is not the Constitution as such that Makarios wants to change but the political solution of the Cyprus problem which it represents. The German President of the Constitutional Court, Professor Forsthoff, who refused to give judgment against the Turks at Greek dictation, was forced by Makarios to resign. In an interview which he gave on 27th December 1963 to an Associated Press correspondent in Heidelberg, Professor Forsthoff said that he himself was convinced that if Makarios' Government had been able to stick to the Constitution for five years most of the problems would have been mastered. "I have told Makarios that time and again" he said. But Makarios had no intention of sticking to the Constitution, because sticking to the Constitution would bring about trust and confidence, understanding and friendship. People would settle down to a normal life. That was not what he wanted. He wanted the people to doubt each other so that he could guide his own policy of abrogating the Agreements and the Constitution. The Greek leadership clamour incessantly for the abrogation of the Agreements and the Constitution for one reason alone. They look upon these documents which gave birth to the Republic of Cyprus as an impediment to their realisation of ENOSIS. *A Federal System* of shared governmental responsibilities, like our own, is generally best suited for societies of varying ethnic backgrounds. This truth is particularly valid in Cyprus, where deep-rooted rivalries can so readily be nurtured when political aspirations of the majority raise justified suspicions. The bloody events since last December in which massacre was used as an instrument of constitutional reform have killed all hope for a united regime. The fears of the Turkish population will not be soothed by guarantees or safeguards in constitutions. Such paper guarantees will not by themselves restore confidence. How can they since Makarios, despite his word and despite his eminence as a religious leader, scraps the Agreements he signed with no more respect for constitutions than for toilet-paper. I believe that all the peace-loving people of the world should speak out in strong defence of international law. If we are to look the other way while international treaties are flagrantly broken and while murder has become a national weapon for Makarios' forces, we sow nothing but the seeds of international strife from which only enemies of peace can reap rewards.

Our consolation is that Makarios can fool some of the people some of the time but not all the people all the time.

A Greek View

A. G. Gavrielides

The tragic situation which has developed in Cyprus has been continuously dominating the news in the international press, radio and television. But in spite of all the sensational headlines and announcements about the bloodshed and other misfortunes of the Cypriot people, one may remark with regret that very few people were given the opportunity to study the present developments objectively in the light of facts relevant to the historical background and the real cause of the trouble.

Since the British occupation of the Island in 1878, when the Turks ceased to be the masters, Greeks and Turks lived and worked harmoniously together; the Turkish population progressively accepting the rights of the Greek majority, without complaint, and without any national aspirations.

The Greeks, on the other hand, from the landing of the first British Governor, put forward their rightful claim for self-determination and from then on maintained an increasing pressure towards that end, until 1955 when the adamant 'NO' and the relentless 'NEVER' of the British Government at the time culminated in the events of 1955-59. During that period the Turks in Cyprus, inspired and stirred by Britain and Turkey, put forward the cruel and impossible claim of partition.

In 1959 the Governments of Britain, Greece and Turkey imposed upon the people of Cyprus, by the treaty of Zurich, an anachronistic, unjust and unworkable constitution which gave Turkey, Greece and Britain the right of intervention when the enforcement of the Treaty or the *status quo* was threatened.

At that time no consideration was given to the artificial creation, by the Turkish Cypriots themselves, of conditions justifying Turkish intervention (insurrection and murderous activities). This is what actually happened on the 22nd of December last, when an armed Turkish gang in the early hours of the morning fired against the police in Nicosia; with that incident a callous attack was launched against the Greek sector of the city and an elaborate plan was uncovered, aimed at the seizure of power, and the creation of de facto partition of the Island. The following

events show quite consistently that the extremist group of the Turkish Cypriot leadership has made every effort to create the required conditions for a Turkish intervention towards that end.
At the same time came various attempts to "solve" the problem by bringing NATO to the scene and the British Government has shown remarkable zeal in trying to dissuade the Cypriot Government from taking the critical question to the Security Council. In spite of all the pressure and threats of intervention, the Cypriot Government, thanks to the heroic courage of the Greek population and the most valuable solidarity of other friendly nations, bravely took the only sensible path — the road to UNO.

It was with great relief and joy that the population welcomed the UN contingents in Cyprus — and to the profound dismay of those who realised that their vicious plots would soon fail. Still there are many obstacles to be overcome before the authority of law and order is fully re-established and life returns to normal.

The Greeks in Cyprus have always extended friendship and co-operation to the Turks and they have no reason to fight them. They have affirmed their confidence in the UNO and its ability to find a solution to the Island's problems in full accordance with its Charter. They ask for nothing but justice through the UNO and they are prepared to give every safeguard to the religious, cultural and educational rights of the Turkish minority. The Greeks justifiably seek the rights of the majority as generally recognised in all parts of the world.

Now, under the supervision and mediation of UNO, without malicious foreign interference, the Cypriot people are quite capable of solving their problems in a spirit of justice and friendship.

Broken Rifle badges

Broken Rifle badges are available from the Dutch WRI Section, Algemene Nederlandse Vredes Actie—ANVA, postbus 385, Amsterdam, Holland. The badges, attractively designed, are of two types, the long pin or brooch.
Prices: Long pin FI.5 (10/-) for 10; 45 FI. (£4 10/-) for 100. Brooch 50 FI. (£5) for 100. The brooch type is only available in large quantities. The badges will be supplied after receipt of payment. Buyers in Britain and countries outside Europe should bear in mind the possibility of customs duties.

22 An Appeal

Dr. Ihsan Ali, a prominent Turkish Cypriot politician of Paphos, who has always supported the idea that the Greek and Turkish communities can live together in Cyprus and who is well known for his moderation as well as for his support for Mr. Inonu, sent the following cable to the Turkish Premier on March 16th, 1964:

" URGENT.
His Excellency Ismet Inonu
The Premier, Turkey

Those who are trying to lead you and your Government to adventures on account of the Cyprus tragedy created through the principle of ' divide and rule ' are either traitors or incapable of perceiving international relations. Both Turkey and the peoples of the world are now as fortunate in your premiership as was the Turkish nation under your presidency during the second World War.

We are surprised at those who cannot appreciate these realities. I am sure your foresight will bring about the failure of those who are trying to mislead you and your Government into a difficult position by leading Turkey to a war, and to turn this island into hell by putting forward to world opinion the nonsensical allegation that the two communities cannot live together in Cyprus.

On behalf of the citizens who cannot raise their voice owing to the prevailing threats and terrorism."

Doctor Ihsan Ali
Paphos, Cyprus.
from Cyprus Bulletin issued by the official press office.

23 Cyprus: National Crisis or International Conflict

John Dragoumis

Bearing in mind the very special features of the Island problem and society, this writer will try to direct the emphasis, as against the fashionable Press, on Cyprus as the contemporary test-ground of long-brewing international and regional rivalry and tension.

Risking repetition with other writers in the same issue, as well as numerous reports in other publications, one must, however, start this by introducing a few relevant facts, dealing with the primary causes on the local stage.

In the face of imminent conflict based on frustrated demands for long-promised self-determination, the delegates of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and Great Britain met in Zurich and London to produce the now famous 'compromise' Constitution which became effective on 16th August 1960. It was brought to the immediate attention of this writer, by both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, that these historical meetings were all conducted under extreme psychological duress, brought about by the insistent British emphasis with full agreement of the Greek and Turkish Governments on a 'This-or-back-to-chaos' emergency 'solution'.

According to this Constitution, Cyprus became a sovereign republic with a presidential system. The details are described elsewhere in this publication and it is only necessary to add that, as a result, the economic life of the country was paralysed. Each provision underlined differences between the two communities and *de facto* partition was established in the five main towns. Such partition was further exemplified by the creation of the two distinctly separate Assemblies that legislate on a number of issues, private and public, as well as juridical, religious and educational matters. Two further safeguards which aggravated the *de facto* ethnic split into a *de jure* socio-political and economic one were the compulsory act, by which even if a citizen is neither Greek nor Turkish he is compelled to state his allegiance to one of the two electoral bodies; and the right of each community to seek and secure financial subsidies from its 'corresponding guarantor Government' (ie Greece and Turkey) as well as 'contributions in educational personnel'. By the same Articles the two official languages are Greek and Turkish and every single speech in the House must be translated immediately

into one or other of these. The same thing goes for all national and religious holidays.

By the Zurich Agreement the powers acting as guarantors undertake to safeguard the implementation of this Constitution by defining as 'fundamental and unalterable' most of the Articles that make for the partition elements mentioned above. Characteristically, Paragraph A of Article 185 prohibiting the *de jure* partition of the Island is not defined as 'fundameintal' while Paragraph B prohibiting union with Greece is defined as 'fundamental and unalterable'! Under the same heading go the two treaties: the first constituting the Three-Power guarantee over "independence, sovereignty and security of Cyprus, the application of all fundamental Articles of the Constitution and respect for British sovereignty over all areas of the Republic that are at present used as military bases"; the second, known as the "Treaty of Alliance" of Cyprus with Greece and Turkey, provided for the establishment of a Tripartite General Staff on Cypriot soil and the despatch of Greek and Turkish expeditionary forces of 950 and 650 men respectively.

According to reports, the symptoms of administrative paralysis, bankruptcy and inter-communal boycotts have increased considerably within the last four years, culminating in the bloody incidents of last Christmas. Characteristically, just before the open conflict took place, the Turkish Cypriots had requested their delegates to demand the extension of the jurisdiction of Turkish municipalities over "some Greek Cypriots who should be compelled to contribute financially in order to render such municipalities viable again"!

For reasons we shall examine later, when the unworkability of the Constitution began to have an ever-increasing impact on the daily life of the young Republic and Makarios and his quite moderate entourage started sounding around for the best time to begin talks for revising certain sections, Britain acted through its Governor, Sir Arthur Clark, as a friendly catalyst, encouraging and indeed aiding Makarios in the speeding up of a Constitutional settlement. From a press statement made in Cyprus by a British spokesman in the last week of November 1963 we learn that "H.M. Government does not believe present Greek-Cypriot requests for Constitutional revision are at all unreasonable". On the other hand, President Makarios, in a press interview last August, stated that "negotiations for generating a possible Constitutional revision will not be started before the Spring of 1964 at the earliest", in all probability counting on the election of a new British Government. When, under these circumstances, the Government of Cyprus proceeded to negotiate with the interested parties for revision, the British official attitude changed overnight to one of uncommitted neutrality with the suggestion of Sir Arthur Clark's recall. Between the time when Makarios submitted his Memorandum, with British

aid, to Vice-President Kutchuk and the period of inter-communal hostilities, several weeks had intervened, during which British policy made itself felt by a total absence of any peacemaking initiative.

It is pretty much of a truism to say that today, more than ever before, the geographical nature of an island such as Cyprus, together with its natural isolation, does not lend itself to establishment of independent rule when it comes to socio-political and economic questions which reflect directly on a world scene of general interdependence.

One must, then, in order to fit this problem into the more global pattern of alignments and readjustments take as many analytical snapshots as possible of the present stage of such developments. On the commercial-political and therefore the diplomatic-military levels we may venture to pinpoint certain key points where the intensified general trend is more evident to the naked eye — that is the systematic displacement of British interests by American power.

To start with the most remote and gradually come closer to our present stage: In an article on January 19th, *Le Monde* pointed to the new directives of United States foreign policy in the Far East, attributing their so far successful manoeuvres and the intentions behind them to commercial rivalry. Some time ago, as a direct result of negotiations between Robert Kennedy and President Sukarno of Indonesia, the Dutch were unceremoniously displaced from Dutch West Guinea. On the same principle, but this time directed against British vested interests in rubber, cast-iron and oil, the United States is swiftly moving in, in consultation with Sukarno, for their 'Malaysia Minor' plan, which is proving instrumental in reducing commercial domination by Britain from such old centres as Hong-Kong and Singapore.

It is also probably more than coincidence that at about the same period things in India and Pakistan from Britain's point of view took a turn for the worse. The United States' Seventh Fleet appeared in the Indian Ocean for the first time.

This consistent American effort to create a vacuum within the traditional hunting grounds of 'Pax Britannica' (otherwise referred to as "neo-colonialist schemes" or even "exploiting inner-imperialist contradictions") and gradually to replace it by infusing 'Pax Americana' bears a fitting connection with their other related efforts to by-pass the more pressing questions of the Middle Eastern crisis area by seeking to compromise ever-more demanding Arab Nationalism at the expense of British interests.

To spell this last one out in more detail: the common denominator of Anglo-American solidarity in Middle Eastern policies is their mutual oil cartel. It has been agreed by all members of this cartel, with the full backing of their Governments, to stand absolutely

26 firm to any further demands from oil-producing countries, for which Arab Nationalism serves as the militant carrier. However, here again the catalyst appears in the form of relative changes: British shrinkage versus American pre-eminence in the holding companies of the entire oil industry. And still this only forms a part of it, specifically the Middle Eastern dimension. Globally, it must, or so it seems to me, fit in with the entire pattern of British set-backs within the last few years: the Suez crisis, the Katanga displacement, the EEC rebuff, the ousting from Zanzibar, recurrent defence fiascos based on Britain's pathological and undeterring nuclear independence, substantial falls and recessions in trade and an ever-decreasing influence in the Councils of East-West negotiations. It was no precedent when President Johnson chose to invite first the German Chancellor, then the Italian Prime Minister while postponing Sir Alec Douglas-Home's visit to a later date. One may add here that United States foreign policy and the Anglo-American 'special relationship' have diverged to the point where the latter loses all meaning.



27 Going back to the Arab countries and to complete the description of the United States programme, the first break in solidarity came with the American promise to support an Arab venture to reclaim the greater part of their royalty-capital deposited traditionally in British banks bearing nominal interest rates and channelled through the facilities provided by British protectorates and bases in Arab countries. From estimates, considered rather conservative, of the Italian State-Oil enterprise, these British super-profits from the deposits amount to roughly 200 million pounds sterling a year. With that kind of money, Americans explained, the Arabs (in this case mostly Sheiks, Emirs and other feudal chieftains) could very well set up an Investment Bank for local projects and receive the same benefits as before by depositing far less in United States banks! So much, then, for United States-Arab manoeuvres at the expense of British interests. Britain, on the other hand, both in order to rectify the original Western alignments in that area and to rekindle Israeli antagonism, has encouraged in every possible way Tel-Aviv to go ahead with the project to utilise the waters of the river Jordan, knowing full well that this must provoke a solid anti-Western Arab reaction.

On the defence side, the Home administration has tracked a distinct course of overall rationalisation. The reappraisal involves adjustments in Britain's nuclear status without lessening its mythical independence and an attempt to reorganise bases abroad with double-purpose efficiency. The intention is both to provide for the now outdated anti-Soviet Alliance and the up-to-date post-imperialist power-political game. This, according to the researches of American peace-workers, has also been informally agreed between the two countries' Defence Departments (dubbed the plan for 'rationalising Britain's network of conventional bases') provided the United States would not be involved at any given time in calling for the re-establishment of a disrupted but tacitly agreed East-West status quo. Not forgetting the careful timing of the British policy-makers in precipitating the recent Cyprus crisis, we must add here the concurrence, in the more strictly political sense, of changes in the regimes of both Turkey and Greece indicating, especially in the case of Greece, clear signs of a more independent foreign policy.

With this framework, then, we may draw some straight lines from all these pressure fronts: an assurance from the British presence in the nearby Eastern Mediterranean to both Israelis and feudal Arab protegés; an insurance that the dangerously non-aligned status of Cyprus should not further neutralise the bases on the Island; a reassurance for up-to-date readiness to NATO's senior partner coupled with a reminder of the nuisance value still residing with some of Britain's key posts, which could be used to bring pressure if Uncle Sam were carried away by his calculations of apparent British weakness. This was demonstrated essentially by

28 Home finally turning down United States-West German insistence that NATO should handle the whole affair after the crisis was finally brought out into the open.

This we should recognise then. The Island is fertile ground for nationalistic antagonisms and hostilities no more than other areas with similar problems, and only as much as the international crisis produces. A sympton, if raised to a high enough degree, can become the issue compelling the originating cause to all but disappear. Yet, behind the thin paper of the Island map, there is a lot more than just that. Cyprus lies at the intersection of the lines of conflicting international interests.

WRI Study Conference 1964

Even though the long-cherished hope of holding a Study Conference in Poland has had to be abandoned, plans this year promise an eventful conference in Germany. The Verband der Kriegsdienstverweigerer, one of the three German Sections, has invited the WRI to Germany and has undertaken the task of organisation there. The theme is *The Non-Violent Solution of Conflict with Special Reference to Germany and the Berlin Problem*. The Conference will be from the 9th-15th August at the Naturfreundhaus, near Offenbach, Frankfurt/Main. Further details will be available shortly. BOOK NOW by sending £1 or equivalent Conference fee to the International Secretariat.

29 Conciliation

Richard Hauser

If the peace movement is to prove itself a movement of peace-makers able not only to practice goodwill but also to gain the public's goodwill, it is necessary for it to make an effort to outgrow its rebellious adolescence. So far its own very limited view of itself restricted its scope to the fight against war; the real issue however is the fight against man's inhumanity to man, whether retail or wholesale, war being the greatest and most extreme form of violence, but negligence of one's fellow, born of indifference or of "I couldn't care lessness", being another less spectacular but more subtle degree of the same disease. Today's apathy produces tomorrow's violence.

A new type of peace worker is needed who is not only willing to die for the cause but also to work for it. New techniques are needed to train these new people in the uses of a rational, systematic know-how, applicable to different ideologies.

A basic understanding of human tensions, of group structures, of the degrees of apathy and of violence and of the factors generally responsible for social inadequacy will provide the elementary basis for an intelligent synthesis of emotion and reason, the one giving strength and the other direction, experience, knowledge.

New people using new tools are needed to replace the old "war horses", the pacifists, who in the public eye are divided into starry-eyed fools or cranky rebels for rebellion's sake. Both types combine to form a kind of self-appointed élite well separated from those they should be helping and guiding.

There is no doubt a time for gestures, but this time has passed: gestures no longer convince. Now is the time for action. The time has come to face the two great enemies of progress, apathy and violence and to make it possible for the great body of citizens to become responsible and enlightened. We do not need a great peace army selling patent medicines against war but a great force for conciliation acting constructively all along the spiral from the bottom (that is 250 yards from wherever each of us lives or works) right up to international conflict areas. The same principles governing local action against injustice also apply to action

against injustice on the widest scale. Details will differ according to cultural and geographical contexts but the unifying concepts linking local challenges to international ones will always be how to outgrow, how to overcome, man's inhumanity to man.

Until now here were two distinct approaches to the problem:

1) By way of enthusiasm (let us all love each other).

2) By way of indignation (let us take immediate rebellious action now — we'll show them).

A third attitude, leading nowhere, expresses itself in academic studies on war and peace with the help of computers in ivory towers.

We now need a training system which takes into account all three patterns, enthusiasm, indignation, curiosity and doubt, and links them all into practical and constructive social action.

Let us take Cyprus as a case in point: what could not have been done two years ago, when the peace people were so busy in committees and in the performance of dramatic gestures that they had no time for any peace work?

What can well-meaning persons do today for Cyprus, which will be useful tomorrow in Spain, South Africa or the deep South? What tools can be fashioned to make Operation Cyprus a pilot on which fundamental information can serve a new pilot in Urundi? Already the outline of an initial programme suggests itself:

1) Prepare for work in Cyprus two or three months ahead of time by doing as much work as possible from here.

2) Set up a HQ or secretariat, under the auspices of a sponsoring body free of vested interest so as to be acceptable to all and therefore able to bring into it anyone who genuinely wishes to help.

3) Examine and select volunteers on the basis of a one-day training session followed by a period of practical work on which they must report before qualifying for the next training session. Sort out the volunteers according to whether they are

(a) Young, well-meaning,
(b) Seasoned administrators,
(c) Intellectuals,
(d) Socially inadequate, etc.

4) Gather information on Cyprus:

(a) What sources of information can be opened up, here and there?
(b) Who suffers most there?
(c) What is the situation of Greek and Turkish school children, wounded in hospital, homeless, evacuees, of Greeks in Turkey?

(d) What are the alternatives to partition? To evacuation?
(e) What auspices could future observers go under, which would establish some initial goodwill between Greeks and Turks, so that they will have had a chance to read about them in the papers, to discuss them and to develop a personal interest in them before the first observers ever go out there.
(f) Should Greek or Turkish villages be rebuilt? Who is to live in them?
(g) Should one team go out, or two or three?

5) What can we propose from here?

(a) Short range (immediate steps).
(b) Middle range (till the end of year).
(c) Long range (e.g. alternative conciliation projects if we have no chance to do anything in Cyprus at this moment).

6) What bodies working independently from us could we co-operate with?

7) Who could take overall responsibility for such an operation?

8) (a) Could one form a church committee of Greek Orthodox, Moslems and Quakers?
(b) Are there any other groups likely to be able to unite the factions?
(c) Could one form a local committee on or by Cypriots in Britain, in the Camden Town or Islington areas in London?

9) What could special groups of people offer; the Doctors Association, Schools, Universities, Women?

10) Who is the most likely catalyst to succeed in breaking through?

11) What can we do now because we are English? What can we do now because we are not English?

How many Cypruses need to happen before the Peace Movement decides to do something about peace?

We will be glad to supply the technical know-how and to help in any way we can anyone interested.

The Centre for Group Studies,
73 Clarence Gate Gardens,
Glentworth Street, London, N.W.1.

32 Emergency Meeting on Cyprus

Devi Prasad

On the initiative of several organisations, including the WRI, the International Sub-Committee of the Committee of 100 called an emergency meeting in London on the 15th March. It was attended by representatives of several organisations and by Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Some were a little anxious when they became aware of the Cypriot participation at such an early stage but it transpired that this factor gave political reality to the general concern.

It was a difficult meeting. For almost 2 hours the Greek and Turkish sides put the case against each other. The Turkish Cypriots felt that as a minority they were being dominated and suppressed by the Greek majority and that the first requirement was to remove Makarios and his Government from power. Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, were greatly concerned over the Turkish Cypriots' loyalty to Turkey rather than to Cyprus.

It was difficult, almost impossible, to convey to them the different approach of peace movements in England and the principles of non-violence and creative neutralism. Everyone was concerned to stop the killing which would be intensified if not checked immediately. From this point of unity the divergence occurred on methods to be employed.

After a long discussion a three-point programme was placed before the meeting:

(a) A Peace in Cyprus Committee be formed in London which should try to involve not only individuals from peace movements but as many Greeks, Turks and Cypriots as possible. It should work out a plan of action and a policy statement.

(b) 2 or 3 individuals should be sent to Cyprus to study the situation, to report back and suggest what could be done towards establishing peace there. These individuals should carry on their work quietly without publicity. They should be able to go and meet both sides.

(c) A long-term comprehensive peace programme should be drawn up to enable peace organisations to play their part. This programme should include establishing an active movement in

Cyprus which would work for the educational, social and cultural developments of the country and put emphasis on reconciliation and the concept of a world without war.

The following statement was agreed upon:

1) That all Cypriots, including the police, be urged to put down their arms.

2) That people from Greece and Turkey, particularly those of the organised peace movement, be asked to take practical steps to urge their compatriots in Cyprus to put down their arms.

3) That whereas culturally and historically there will always be Greeks and Turks in Cyprus politically they should decide their future first and foremost as Cypriots.

4) That in the context of 1) above Greece, Turkey and Great Britain should renounce their treaty rights to intervene in Cyprus (this involving withdrawal from existing bases) and that the two power-blocs should respect the neutrality of the Island.

If the WRI receives a sufficient number of bulk orders the articles in this edition of WAR RESISTANCE relating to CYPRUS will be re-published in the form of a pamphlet. The next edition will deal mainly with Berlin and the German problem.

Civilian Defence

Devi Prasad's "review" of *Civilian Defence* disappointed me very much. In addition to his dogmatism, he also avoids taking up the arguments given by Adam Roberts and others for a non-violent defence system organised here and now, without any alteration in the social structure of our society.
Devi Prasad thinks it "naive" to suggest a threat to freedom from the Communist countries. I think it is both naive and irresponsible to ignore it. Not because of any aggressiveness "inherent in Communism," but because conflicts do exist, and we have no guarantee against getting mixed up in one. And if there is an invasion, there will in all probability be attempts to take over our institutions and limit our present freedoms of speech, organisation, etc. This is what we want to defend ourselves against. (It does not mean that the *only* threat to freedom is posed by the Communist countries, and *Civilian Defence* never says so. Anyway, the question of who poses the threat is immaterial to its whole argument.)
"Non-violent defence presupposes a non-violent society" is the essence of much criticism of *Civilian Defence*. This prompts me to ask: what is this non-violent society, really? Are we able to formulate, at this stage, the principles of such a society—except in the most general and vague terms? (Mulford Q. Sibley in his anthology *The Quiet Battle* seems to take a position similar to Devi Prasad's, but his description of a "non-violent society" suggests but an improved variety of a Scandinavian welfare state to me.) What is a non-violent society in terms of distribution of power, organisation of industry and the mass media, etc?
The argument that the existing social set-up cannot be defended by non-violence is not convincing, either, though it is important to attempt, as Adam Roberts has done, to evaluate what can be defended by non-violence and what cannot. Overseas bases obviously belong to the second category. Alistair Buchan, in his preface, thinks (somewhat surprisingly) that non-violent defence would have effects on the social structure, but the point he really is making is that these changes could be accepted by any bourgeois, non-revolutionary democrat.

 The fundamental question is this: what should pacifists offer to people who believe there is a threat of military conflict and occupation? A programme of defence or a programme of 'revolutionary social change'? I suggest that to take the second course is to shirk our responsibilities, as long as we are not clear ourselves on what a non-violent society is, and when we know full well that it cannot be realised tomorrow by some mysteriously occurring revolution, but, if at all, by the slow and painful road of progress and reform. Meanwhile, a programme of non-violent defence is necessary.
Two more points, in brief: There is only one element of "salesmanship" in *Civilian Defence*, namely the title (for which I think the editors may be forgiven.) It is true that "the success of non-violence does not depend on salesmanship," but creative action is not enough either. Creative *thinking* is what we need more than almost anything else, and *Civilian Defence* is a good beginning.

Nils Petter Gleditsch,
Ovre Skogvei 12, Oslo 2, Norway.

Peace Research

I have been very interested to read the issue of *War Resistance* on the Conferences at Stavanger and Charbonnières, and have been trying to assemble my own thoughts on the subject of pacifism and social change.
Hannah Arendt, in her book on Eichmann, points to the likely outcome of the population explosion, the discovery of technical devices which make large sections of the population superfluous, and the development of nuclear energy to produce weapons which make Hitler's gas chambers seem like an evil child's fumbling toy.
I think this is an accurate forecast of the future and to meet this threat the pacifist movement should attempt to bring about radical changes in our way of life. By 'way of life' I mean the size of the family group—whether it is small and exclusive, as in Europe, or large and comprehensive, as in Asia and Africa—whether people work with their hands or with machines, whether they work in small groups or in large factories, how the products of their labour are distributed, how provision is made for people who do not work, whether the populace is settled in villages or cities, whether their life is organised on a competitive or co-operative basis, whether

government is carried on by authoritarian or democratic means, etc.

F. C. Hunnius at Stavanger pointed out the necessity of a movement offering its followers hope for a better future. To achieve this, we must have a very clear idea of the type of society we want and of the economic and social changes required to bring it about. I am aware that the research work demanded by these aims would probably call for resources beyond the capacity of the pacifist movement alone; but I trust and believe that help would be forthcoming from people outside the movement who are equally concerned about the future of mankind. However, I think that control of such research work should remain in the hands of pacifists committed to non-violence.

It would be simplest to commence by studying the social and economic systems of those communities whose members are able to live at peace with each other and with their neighbours.

It is frequently objected that such "primitive" forms of society cannot be adapted to our industrial civilisation, to which I feel inclined to reply, "So much the worse for our industrial civilisation." If it cannot be adapted to a more peaceable and humane mode of existence, it must be scrapped.

We know that Hopi Indians of Arizona and the inhabitants of Tristan da Cunha managed to evolve societies in which there was little or no crime or violence. The police of Western Samoa have little serious crime to cope with, as the Samoans are organised in small groups. Each family elects a Headman and the government of the territory is in turn elected from these representatives. When a problem arises, it is taken to a Headman and very thoroughly discussed, with the result that a solution is frequently discovered before tension reaches breaking point. It might assist in the maintenance of peace if this method of government were adopted in other parts of the world.

As regards the family, WRI members in India and Africa are in a position to give first-hand accounts of arrangements in those countries. I think the conventional European group of parents and children is too small and should include other relatives. A death in such a small group can bring loneliness and hardship to the surviving members, especially to the widow or widower struggling to earn a living and to look after young children. Children who lose both or one parent often have to exchange normal family life for life in an institution. Our society is full of lonely old people, sole survivors of their respective families, living in one room or a 'home,' dependent on the services of a government department or a charitable organisation. Next to the quality of family life, the kind of work people do is of the greatest importance. If their daily work does not leave them with a sense of fulfilment, they will be liable to

develop feelings of frustration and resentment which may spread through the entire community. I do not know enough about automation to judge its desirability. I did see a photograph of the spinning shed of a large cotton mill, in which one girl was in charge of all the machines — solitary confinement is not a fit way for any human being to spend his working days.

I am worried by the thought that the nature of the work performed by many people cannot satisfy their mental or emotional needs. Life for them is reduced to mere existence; they live—if they live at all—outside working hours. I suspect that, as a result, many people feel in their heart of hearts that life is not really worth living, and that is why they acquiesce in preparations for nuclear war. If they had had any experience of the joy of life, they would revolt against the mere idea of mass destruction.

Distribution of the products of labour is a problem in most areas of the world. In our own society, we are busily occupied in producing more and more of everything irrespective of whether we need it or not, to stave off economic collapse and mass unemployment. Bertrand Russell suggested in his 'Roads to Freedam' that everyone should be guaranteed the basic necessities of life whether he worked or not. Here again, the methods of "primitive" societies might be studied with advantage.

Danilo Dolci queried the 'maximum number of individuals which can practically express itself in a group.' My experience of office work suggests that ten is the maximum number in which the individual can make himself felt. In groups exceeding that number the impersonal element begins to operate. Of course, the premises on which the group is based are of fundamental importance. A small, tightly-knit organisation whose members had the wrong attitudes could develop feuds on the scale of a Greek tragedy.

Since we have been able to solve the problem of how to send a man into space, we should be capable of solving the problem of how to make life happier for ourselves here on earth.

Shortage of funds is a chronic condition with me, but I would gladly contribute something towards the cost of such an extensive piece of research work. I am convinced that something of this sort is essential if the pacifist movement is to make a positive contribution to the resolving of the world's problems.

Margaret Langford,
46 Bazentin Street, Belfield, Sydney, NSW, Australia.

Stuart Morris Retires

Harold F. Bing

The retirement of Stuart Morris from the General Secretaryship of the Peace Pledge Union (the British Section of the WRI) at its Annual General Meeting in April 1964 is an important landmark in the life of both the British and the international pacifist movement. During the past quarter of a century he has played a significant role in both.

Born in 1890, Stuart D. Morris was educated at Cranleigh School, Corpus Christi College, Cambridge and Cheshunt Theological College. He was ordained as a priest in the Church of England at Southwark in 1913 and after serving in a mission in South London, acted as a naval chaplain in World War I. He had become a pacifist in his undergraduate days and already before war broke out had decided that he could not undertake military service. After the war he was active in the Industrial Christian Fellowship and was invited by the then Bishop of Birmingham to become his Diocesan Secretary. When Bishop Barnes succeeded to the see, he invited Stuart to continue in this office and made him a Canon of Birmingham Cathedral in 1933, an office which he held for five years. At this time he was active in many fields of religious work, both social and educational, including the secretaryship of the Committee for Religious Broadcasting of the BBC (Midland Region).

The great change in Stuart Morris's field of work came with the formation of the Peace Pledge Union and his association with its founder, Canon H. R. L. Sheppard ("Dick" Sheppard), in this movement. In 1934, at Dick Sheppard's request, he became a half-time worker for the PPU and later, in 1936, this developed into full-time service as its General Secretary, a post he has occupied since then except for a short intermission due to his imprisonment following a government prosecution. He then felt it right to offer his resignation to the PPU Council. This was accepted with regret and for a short time the secretaryship was held by Rev. Patrick Figgis.

Stuart Morris attended his first WRI Conference in 1937, when he was one of the PPU representatives at our fifth International Conference in Copenhagen and he was continually re-elected at

each succeeding conference up to and including the Gandhigram Conference of 1960. He did not stand for election at the Stavanger Conference last summer.

As General Secretary of the PPU, Stuart Morris has directed its policy and activities with remarkable energy and ability—a task in which he has been supported for many years, until her retirement last December, by Sybil Morrison as Campaign Organiser. His contacts with people in official and public positions have often been of great value to the pacifist movement and he has been largely responsible for that close co-operation among pacifist organisations in Great Britain, evidenced by the establishment of the Standing Joint Committee of Pacifist Organisations. Out of this collaboration came such activities as the Working Party which produced in 1957 the report "Unarmed," dealing with conditions under which unilateral disarmament would be possible. It was largely his efforts which made possible the visit to Russia in 1958 of a joint delegation of British peace and pacifist organisations.

Stuart Morris has always been keenly interested in the international side of the pacifist movement and realised that only through close international co-operation could pacifists hope to make any real impact on world public opinion or influence political events. He represented the Peace Pledge Union on the old International Peace Bureau and when that organisation became moribund, played an active role in the establishment of the International Liaison Committee of Organisations for Peace (ILCOP), which was founded in Geneva in 1949 to bring new life and more radical attitudes into the international peace movement. He has taken an active part in the annual conferences of ILCOP (which has now assumed the name of International Peace Bureau again) and has served continuously on its Bureau.

For the WRI, Stuart has always had a special affection and for a short time after his release from prison and before he resumed the General Secretaryship of the PPU, he gave his time to its work. As noted above, he joined the Council in 1937 and, as far as I know, his only absence from a Council meeting was from the restricted war-time meeting in 1943, the Minutes of which record that he sent his apologies. Stuart has not only been a Council member for 26 years but has also served on our Executive Committee where his advice and help have been of the greatest value. He has always been ready to assist in special missions, whether it was interviewing ambassadors in London, attending special conferences at home or abroad, or undertaking speaking tours. Our German members will remember his numerous visits to Germany where he has spoken in many cities. Our Finnish Section will recall his presence at their inaugural meeting in 1958, on his way back from Russia. Many Americans

will remember his lecture tour in USA, which began with a spell on Ellis Island, while the authorities were deciding whether his pacifist views were a threat to the security of the United States! At WRI Conferences he has always been ready to work hard behind the scenes as well as on the floor of the conference and many policy statements and documents owe much to his skill as a draughtsman and his ability to bring together different points of view in a purposeful agreed statement. His wisdom and experience will be greatly missed both in the British and the international movement. We desire here to place on record our sense of gratitude for so much able and willing service and to wish Stuart and his wife Hilda (formerly Hilda von Klenze) much happiness in their retirement to a quiet village in East Anglia. At the same time we welcome, as the new General Secretary of the PPU, Bernard Withers, formerly Secretary of the Central Board for Conscientious Objectors, and look forward to a long period of useful co-operation with him.

International work camp/seminar for conscientious objectors.
Switzerland, 19th July — 2nd August.
Information WRI Secretariat.

A View of Sarvodaya

Max Maxwell

I have spent a year in India, mostly in the North in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal and Assam, on the Delhi-Peking Friendship March. With the March I did not find much opportunity for deep contact with the Sarvodaya movement's own work, as we had our own specific programme which did not agree in all its aspects with the views and positions current in Sarvodaya. Also, this was a time of many tensions, in which we were closely involved, resulting from the border conflict, and all the emotion aroused by the word 'aggression' were running high even in many quarters in Sarvodaya. For these reasons my view of Sarvoday is bound to be from a definite viewpoint, as it was not possibl for me, except for a brief period after the March, to be a fr enquirer under the circumstances.

The political context in India is unique inasmuch as the leaders of the Government and of Sarvodaya were both involved in the nonviolent independence struggle with Gandhi, and such ties continue strong today. There are young leaders rising in Sarvodaya with independent thoughts, but the overall tone is set by those of Gandhi's generation, especially by the spiritual head of Sarvodaya, Vinoba Bhave, who is considered Gandhi's spiritual heir. The head of the Indian Government, Jawaharlal Nehru, was called the 'jewel of India' by Gandhi himself, and he epitomises the way in which many leading Indians find themselves deep believers in the efficacy and philosophy of nonviolence yet unable to place their immediate trust in it as a course of action because of what they view as 'the unreadiness of the people for nonviolence at this stage'.

It is too easy to label this, as many Western observers have, as a 'double standard morality'. There is a firm widespread belief in and out of Sarvodaya, that dealing with the British and dealing with the Chinese, both historically and racially, are two completely different concepts. The reins of political administration are entrusted to Nehru, those of spiritual leadership to Vinoba; these two kinds of leadership are regarded as complementary, not as divergent and incompatible. Hence Vinoba's tacit support of the Nehru Government's military response to the Chinese. There

exists the belief that the 'superiority' of nonviolence will assert itself over violence eventually, and that until that time the two methods must run parallel, with Sarvodaya — and its corollary of nonviolence — gradually spreading and establishing itself among the people of the nation, and then of the world. The sense of immediacy and necessity of separation from, and action against, the Government's policies on such issues as war are therefore not only lacking but consciously rejected both for the above reason, and because of the strong emotional ties from the pre-independence days under the Mahatma.

Direct challenges and confrontations of the nonviolent devotees with the military and the Administration are therefore almost unthinkable, are regarded as 'crude' (in Vinoba's sense of the word), and even — though it is bitterly regrettable — as superficial and alien methods imported, with overtones of attempted domination, by Western pacifists and nonviolent direct actionists. Following from this, there is without doubt too much distinction made in Sarvodaya between the 'Western-protest-negative' attitude and the Indian 'universal-constructive-positive' approach. There seems to be little desire to adapt, to reconsider on the basis of new ideas and experience from outside, perhaps due to the feeling, (not unconnected with nationalism in the movement) that Indian philosophy has embraced the 'universal' and all paths to 'universality'. But arising from this also is the great freedom within the movement for freethinkers and independent actionists, which is tempered however by the attitude that Vinoba has the best, or superior way, and so to follow him rather than to act according to one's own ideas is natural. This concept may be compared with the freedom and belief in 'many paths' manifest in developing Hinduism. It is certainly this apparent 'lack of direction' or 'lack of clarity' which has irritated some Western observers, who, in many ways correctly, urge that new adaptions have to be made in Sarvodaya as India becomes involved in modern politics and modern war.

Due to the reasons given previously there is a feeling, perhaps among some intellectuals of the movement especially, against 'internationalism' and particularly, unfortunate though it is, following their experiences with the international Friendship March. The criticisms, disillusionments, dissatisfactions and new arguments which were expressed by some Western members of the March and by others in different countries, coming as they did under strenuous circumstances and at a time of great frustration and tension in India, caused a reaction on the part of Sarvodaya which has by now created considerable bad feeling towards international co-operation for peace.

The concept of setting your own house in order first is very strong here, and this, among other factors, has kept the Indian movement (and people) very isolated from the realities of the

international scene. Poor and inadequate press coverage, the sense of India as the home of universal concepts, reactions to imperialism, the desperate need for national social reconstruction, are some of the other contributing factors. The eruption of hostilities on the border with China found Sarvodaya completely unprepared with any prearranged response and all it could do was, as reflected in the Veddchi statement, to assert the right of the Government, under the circumstances, to resort to war. Sarvodaya's first real encounter with and experience of the international peace movement, in terms of expressions of criticism, disillusionment, and a spate of new ideas, has not unnaturally led to a certain hostility and unreceptiveness to the idea of involvement in international peace action, and even to admit that the present Indian Government is beginning to follow the armed Western nations which have been involved in all-out war twice in the past half-century.

Certainly one of the primary lessons which the Indian movement has to learn from its experience during the border crisis is that it has to grow in terms of understanding the world outside its own frontiers as it exists rather than just interpreting it according to the Sarvodaya philosophy; and the extent to which its action or inaction affects this world. Another way in which it can grow is by consciously encouraging new initiative instead of regarding it as outside the pale of accepted thought. It is also clear that, as governmental preparation of military strength increases, at some point believers in nonviolence are going to have to take a clear stand against their Government's military policies, or else condone the possession of nuclear weapons by their nation's allies or by India itself, the existence of nuclear alliances, and later perhaps participation in a full-scale war. It is for those who can see today this disaster of tomorrow to begin new advances in the movement. Whether or not it is believed that an Indian Government will ever resort to mass warfare, a new — namely nonviolent — approach to international conflict has to be built up here to present as the relevant and effective alternative; otherwise Sarvodaya may find itself again faced at the last moment with a 'necessary' military decision, and again be powerless to prevent the destruction of human life.

Bangalore.

The CND in Europe

Since the rise of the CND it has been the WRI's international policy to support Easter March activities and to encourage co-operation between pacifist groups and the new mass movement. In recent months there has been ample opportunity for direct co-operation between the International Secretariat and the various members of the European CND Federation. The International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace brought many non-aligned peace groups together and helped to submerge differences of method and ideology in a united and world-wide approach to the problems of the arms race and the Cold War. It is therefore with regret and an active concern that we note what appears to be a decline in the CND. This has been symbolised by leadership problems in Britain; the absence of Easter demonstrations in Denmark; an increase in factional differences and a lack of clarity on the principles of unilateralism and attitudes to NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In particular, confusion on the NATO question has led the Danish and Norwegian CNDs to adopt a negative attitude to the Confederation.

We need a mass movement — a movement which will stir the conscience of millions throughout the world. Therefore, we must hope that the apparent decline is no more than a sign of radical re-thinking and re-organisation. The appeal of the CND depends first and foremost on the conviction of its moral message and secondly on its ability to act politically in a complex political situation. If the CND fails to follow through the logic of its position which inevitably leads to a unilateral rejection of all weapons East and West and if it mistakenly believes that it can increase its political impact by a flirtation with social democratic parties which are firmly committed to the Western Alliance and the balance of terror then it deserves to decline. Whatever the future holds for the CND pacifists should increase their efforts to develop new and dynamic initiatives.

One of the major concerns of the WRI has been to build up closer contacts and understanding between peace movements of different shades of opinion all over the world. We have played an active part in some of the major efforts towards this goal during the past five years.

The WRI took the initiative in inviting some associates of the World Council of Peace to the 11th Triennial Conference in Norway at which some definite proposals were made. As a result of this, correspondence has been exchanged between the WCP and the WRI and we were invited to send an observer to the WCP Conference in Warsaw in November 1963. Devi Prasad attended. The WCP also proposed a joint meeting of representatives from both organisations to clarify the Stavanger statement and to find out how it could best be implemented. A special Commission was set up by the WRI Executive Committee to produce a re-statement of the WRI's basic position and an exchange of such documents has been suggested in preparation for the meeting. We are hoping that when and if this meeting ever takes place (it has been post-poned twice already) fundamental differences in approach will be clarified and points of common interest will be revealed.

Cyprus

This edition of WAR RESISTANCE has been devoted almost entirely to the Cyprus question. The concern about Cyprus arises out of horror at the violence; the conviction that political solutions alone are not sufficient; the fear that Cyprus will be made a pawn in the Cold War; the belief that the peace movement is not a peace movement if it is not ready to deal with such conflict situations; and the recognition that there is a real need to develop techniques of non-violent intervention.

We are trying to convey reliable information about what is going on because we believe that the Western press has shown a consistent bias in pursuit of Western interests. We are trying to convey the depth of emotional involvement on both sides.

We cannot agree with all that is said in the articles we publish but we believe that together they suggest that no single party is the criminal and no single party the victim. East and West, leaders and led, Greeks and Turks, all are guilty. The peace movement too will share the guilt if it does not take action now for the opportunity of action existed many months before the fighting broke out.

The *Cyprus Bulletin* of the 19th March carried a report that cyclostyled leaflets in Turkish had been found in the Turkish quarter of Limassol. They call for co-operation between Greeks and Turks and urge the latter to turn a deaf ear to the orders of their leaders. We share the opinion of one Turkish Cypriot friend who condemned the rôle which the leaders of both sides have

played in encouraging acts of terrorism and communal hatred. We would like to see more such leaflets distributed in Cyprus calling upon **all** Cypriots of goodwill to ignore **all** leaders who encourage extremism and to act for themselves in the villages and in the towns to restore the bonds of friendship between Greek and Turk which at one time existed. We would in addition urge non-violent solutions but we realise only too well how little the pacifist movement has done to develop the practical application of such solutions in the many areas of conflict which exist all over the world. We want to learn and we want Cypriots to learn with us. This is why the WRI has supported and helped to finance the sending of volunteers to Cyprus who will be mandated to provide a true picture of the situation there at both the political and the human level and to make a start in discovering what effective non-violent action could be taken. The peace movement will enjoy increasing respect from the public we wish to involve in our actions and ideas when it can be clearly demonstrated that it can serve the unique function of keeping the peace without resort to armed force.

The Conscription Front

FRANCE: some 80 COs are waiting to start civilian service with the National Protection Service under the new Act. The rest, Jehovah's Witnesses, are refusing to co-operate and may incur penalties of up to 8 years' detention in a forced labour camp in Corsica. YUGOSLAVIA: A handful of Nazarenes are serving sentences of from 6 to 9 years. We are hoping that the Government will review the situation soon. MALAYSIA: In spite of earlier denials conscription is to be introduced in Malaysia. The PPU has asked the High Commissioner in London for assurances that provision will be made for COs. GERMANY: The number applying for CO registration is falling. GT. BRITAIN: Under the threat of selective conscription from the next British Government, British organisations are already mobilising to resist if necessary. SWITZERLAND: Still without any Statute for COs the Swiss pacifist movement is considering holding an International Work Camp for COs this year to help launch a new campaign for recognition. NEW ZEALAND: Roman Catholic and Protestant schools are keen supporters of cadet training. SWEDEN: A parliamentary committee has been set up to investigate CO conditions and on the initiative of the WRI Section, SVFM, a research committee on CO problems, from many peace organisations, has been at work since September 1963.

Low Finance

On the Balance Sheet for the Financial Year which ended on 31st March our total income, by no means all direct contributions,